

Online Appendix for “Working for the Machine Patronage Jobs and Political Services in Argentina”

Appendix A: Survey Methodology, Representativeness, and Randomization

The survey consisted of face-to-face interviews of 1,184 low- and mid-level local public sector employees in the Argentinean municipalities of Salta (province of Salta), Santa Fe (province of Santa Fe), and Tigre (province of Buenos Aires).¹ Together with a team of research assistants, we interviewed around 400 employees in each municipality. The survey was administered between August 10 and December 30, 2010, in Santa Fe; between August 11 and November 26, 2010, in Tigre; and from June 6 to August 11, 2011, in Salta.² It was preceded by a pilot administered in Santa Fe between July 22 and July 29, 2010, consisting of 40 cases. On average, survey interviews lasted 24 minutes.

A random sample based on the official list of public employees (excluding elected officials and high-level positions) was generated within each municipality. The selected employees were then directly approached for interviews at public offices during their working hours. Since the random sample was drawn from an official and complete list of public employees and the survey was administered during office hours at the municipality, both the permission and the collaboration of the local authorities were crucial. In order to minimize the probability of antagonizing the authorities and maximize the chances of getting their approval for

¹ The survey methodology and the survey instrument were approved under **XX** University IRB protocol IRB-**XX**.

² The survey in Salta was scheduled to be conducted in November and December 2010, but changes in the electoral calendar generated by the death of the main presidential pre-candidate (Nestor Kirchner) made the authorities in Salta reluctant to allow me to conduct the survey on the scheduled dates. As a result, the survey in Salta was administered after the April 2011 local elections (when both the governor and the mayor were reelected), but before the October 2011 national elections.

the survey, I took two precautions. First, I purposely designed the survey instrument to be as short as possible to make sure employees would not be kept away from their jobs for long periods of time. Second, I excluded particularly direct sensitive questions—especially the ones related to the mayor. Authorities in each municipality read the survey instrument carefully but did not censor any of the proposed questions.

I provided interviewers with lists of randomly selected public employees and the addresses of their respective workplaces, which ranged from offices at the city hall or at decentralized offices (*delegaciones*) to parks, construction sites, cemeteries, hospitals, health centers, and the street itself. When the selected employee was not at the workplace at the time of the visit or preferred to answer the survey at a different time of day, I instructed interviewers to make an appointment to return later. If the selected employee refused to answer the survey or the interview could not be conducted after the second attempt, the respondent was replaced with the following name on the official list of public employees. I instructed the interviewers to make detailed records of failed interviews. Because survey and list experiment questions were embedded in the survey instrument with two conditions each—treatment and control—two versions of the questionnaire were used. With the exception of the survey and the list experiment questions, respondents were asked questions from identical questionnaires. Interviewers used the two questionnaires in sequential order, assigning respondents alternatively to either the treatment or the control group.

Since the survey was conducted face-to-face at public offices, getting truthful answers from public employees presented a challenge. While high-ranking public officials usually have their own offices, most public employees in Argentina share their work spaces with others. Public employees could be unwilling to reveal sensitive information in front of others, especially

if they think that their jobs could be jeopardized by their answers. Following standard IRB procedures, all interviews started with the enumerators explaining the purpose of the survey and the confidentiality of all the data collected. Enumerators were instructed to emphasize the strictly academic purpose of the survey and to ensure that respondents understood that the information would not be shared with the mayor or any other person. Besides this standard procedure, I implemented two distinct but complementary strategies to minimize social response bias—whether in the form of inaccurate answers or refusals.

First, I designed a series of survey list experiments with the goal of providing respondents with the anonymity needed to induce them to give accurate information about their political activities. Second, I followed Scacco's (2010) strategy (originally developed to survey rioters in Africa) and split the questionnaire into two parts. Part A of the questionnaire had background and general information about the respondent, as well as the less sensitive questions and the list experiments. Part B had the more sensitive and direct questions about voting behavior, ideology, and political preferences. Each part of the questionnaire was marked with a different survey identification number that could only be matched with a document not available to the enumerators at any time. Apart from this number, the second part of the questionnaire had no information—such as age, gender, or occupation—that could be used to identify the respondent. Enumerators administered Part A of the questionnaire, while the sensitive part (Part B) was read and filled out by the respondents themselves.³ In this way, the other employees in the office were not able to hear the questions or the answers. This part of the questionnaire was designed to be short and easy to understand with only closed-ended questions. Finally, the

³ Literacy rates are very high in Argentina; there was no concern that the respondents would not be able to read and fill out Part B of the questionnaires by themselves. According to the Argentina 2010 census, only 1.96 percent of the total population older than age 10 is illiterate.

respondents were asked to store the second part of the questionnaire in a sealed cardboard box similar to a ballot box (something familiar to Argentines since paper ballots and cardboard ballot boxes are still used in Argentinean elections).⁴

I instructed the enumerators to provide a detailed explanation of these procedures before handing out Part B of the questionnaire to the respondents and to make sure respondents understood that the confidentiality of their responses was fully protected. Their understanding was fundamental to guaranteeing the success of the technique.

Interviewers were recruited from Humanities and Social Science Departments in Santa Fe, Salta, and Buenos Aires and were either advanced undergraduate or recently graduated students. For the purpose of survey verification, basic information about the employees (age, years in the position, and type of contract) was obtained from each of the municipalities and was not distributed to the enumerators. If this information did not match that reported by the interviewer in the survey instrument beyond the reasonable expected mistakes, further verification was conducted on the interviews administered by that interviewer. This second round of verification was done in person (by me) with the respondents.⁵ The contact rate for the survey was 59 percent, the response rate was 56 percent, the cooperation rate 95 percent, and the refusal rate 3 percent. The margin of error was 2.7 percent.⁶

⁴ In a few cases, respondents asked enumerators to fill out part B for them. Enumerators were instructed to agree with these requests, but Part B was still stored in the cardboard box when the survey was completed.

⁵ With this methodology, one enumerator was identified who was fabricating the responses. Her full set of interviews was replaced by finding and interviewing her original set of respondents.

⁶ Rates calculated according to the American Association of Public Opinion Research.

Table A1: Socio-demographic and political characteristics of the municipalities

	Salta	Santa Fe	Tigre
Province	Salta (North)	Santa Fe (Center)	Buenos Aires
Mayoral reelection rate (province)	0.40	0.47	0.46
Mayor	Miguel Angel Isa	Mario Barletta	Sergio Massa
Mayor in power	2003-2015	2007-2011	2007-2013
Mayor's party	Peronist	Radical	Peronist
Electoral Competition	Low	High	Middle/Low
Population 2001	472,971	369,589	301,223
Population 2010	536,113	485,345	376,381
% w/college	9%	11%	7%
% w/health insurance	48%	59%	45%
% poverty	21%	14%	20%

Note: Data from the 2001 Census (except for population, 2010 data was not available at the time of the survey). Mayors are the ones that were in power at the time of the survey. Mayoral reelection rates correspond to the 1983-2007 period (Micozzi 2009).

Table A2: Survey sample representativeness (Salta)

Variable	Surveyed employees		All employees	
	N	%	N	%
Observations	389		4263	
Gender				
Male	228	58.61	2701	63.35
Female	161	41.39	1562	36.65
Start working with current mayor	211*	54.24	1491**	46.75
Older than 40 years old	230	59.13	2121***	70.04
Tenure				
With tenure	242	62.21	2992****	77.11
No tenure	146	37.53	888****	22.89

*1 missing observation

**1074 missing observations

***1235 missing observations

****383 missing observations

Table A3: Survey sample representativeness (Santa Fe)

Variable	Surveyed employees		All employees	
	N	%	N	%
Observations	395		4528	
Gender				
Male	235	59.49	2917	64.42
Female	160	40.51	1611	35.58
Start working with current mayor	141	35.70	1949**	44.87
Older than 40 years old	270*	67.94	2765***	63.34
Tenure				
With tenure	256	64.81	2484	54.86
No tenure	139	35.19	2044	45.14

* 2 observations missing

** 184 observations missing

*** 163 observations missing

Table A4: Survey sample representativeness (Tigre)

Variable	Surveyed employees		All employees	
	N	%	N	%
Observations	400		2406	
Gender				
Male	193	48.25	1323	54.99
Female	207	51.75	1083	45.01
Start working with current mayor	184*	46.00	1034***	45.37
Older than 40 years old	192**	48.61	1201***	52.70
Tenure				
With tenure	88	22.00	475	19.74
No tenure	312	78.00	1931	80.26

* 2 missing observations

** 5 missing observations

*** 127 missing observations

Table A5: Covariate balance across type of questionnaires, by municipality

Variable	Tigre		Santa Fe		Salta		Whole Sample	
	Type 1	Type 2	Type 1	Type 2	Type 1	Type 2	Type 1	Type 2
Observations	199	201	196	199	196	193	591	593
Female	0.55	0.48	0.41	0.40	0.40	0.42	0.46	0.44
Age	39.33	39.65	44.63	44.80	43.86	43.11	42.61	42.51
Education	6.37	6.11	5.30	5.11	5.56	5.63	5.74	5.62

Note: The balanced distribution of the variables across the two conditions suggests that the groups are fairly equivalent on observable characteristics and that the randomization was successful in the three municipalities. None of the differences between control and treatment groups are statistically significant (at the 95 percent level).

Appendix B: Variable Operationalization and Descriptive Statistics

LIST EXPERIMENTS

Treatment activity in bold; Spanish translation in brackets and italics.

I am going to hand you a card that mentions a number of activities. Please, I would like for you to tell me HOW MANY of those you did in the last elections (2009/2011). Please, do not tell me which ones, just HOW MANY.

(Le voy a entregar una tarjeta donde figuran una serie de actividades, quisiera que me señale CUÁNTAS de ellas realizó Ud. en las elecciones del último año (2009/2011). Por favor, no me diga cuáles, sino solamente CUÁNTAS)

Note: 2009 for Santa Fe and Tigre; 2011 for Salta.

A) Electoral Campaigns

- Be a candidate (*Ser candidato*)
- Get informed about the different candidates (*Informarse sobre los distintos candidatos*)
- **Work/help in the electoral campaign** (*Trabajar/ ayudar en la campaña electoral*)
- Get disenfranchised (*Impugnar el voto*)
- Cast a straight-ticket vote for any of the parties (*Votar la lista completa de algún partido*)

B) Political Rallies

- Participate in political meetings (*Participar de reuniones políticas*)
- Vote in the primaries of any party (*Votar en las internas de algún partido*)
- **Attend political rallies** (*Concurrir a movilizaciones o actos electorales*)
- Abstain from voting (*Abstenerse de votar*)
- Get informed about the election on the news (*Informarse acerca de la elección en las noticias*)

C) Monitoring Elections

- Decide whom to vote for at the last minute (*Decidir el voto a último momento*)
- Split the ticket (*Cortar boleta*)
- **Be an election monitor** (*Ser fiscal de mesa*)
- Abstain (*No votar*)
- Cast a null vote (*Anular el voto*)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Mayor Supporter

Do you identify yourself with any party? (*¿Se identifica Ud. con algún partido político?*)

Those who replied YES were asked:

Which party do you identify yourself with? (*¿Con cuál partido se identifica Ud.?*)

Respondents who mentioned the mayor's party in each municipality were coded as Supporters; all the rest were coded as zero.

Supporter (1)

Non-supporter (0)

Mayor Voter⁷

Which party did you vote for in the last local elections for mayor (2007/2011)? (*¿A qué partido/candidato votó en las últimas elecciones municipales para intendente (2007/2001)?*)

Respondents who reported the party of the incumbent mayor in each municipality were coded as mayor voters; all the rest were coded as zero. Respondents who were not registered to vote in the municipality where they worked were coded as missing.

Mayor Voter (1)

Nonvoter (0)

College

Which is your maximum level of education? (*¿Cuál es el máximo nivel educativo alcanzado por Ud.?*)

Recoded into two categories:

College (1)

No College (0)

Age

Could you tell me your age? (*¿Podría decirme su edad?*)

Recoded into five age categories:

18–25 (1)

26–35 (2)

36–45 (3)

46–55 (4)

More than 55 (5)

Female

Note the sex of the respondent (*Registrar el sexo del entrevistado*)

Female (1)

Male (0)

Tenure

What type of contract do you have in the municipality? (*¿Qué tipo de contrato tiene Ud. con la municipalidad?*)

⁷ Note that voting is mandatory in Argentina, and turnout is usually above 70 percent.

Tenure (1) (*Permanente*)

No Tenure (0) (*Temporario/Contratado*)

Reciprocal

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “We always have to return the favors that others have done for us.” Would you say you ... (*Qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo está Ud. con la siguiente afirmación: “Siempre hay que regresar los favores que alguien nos hace”. Diría Ud. que está...*)

- Strongly agree (*Muy de acuerdo*)
- Agree more than disagree (*Más de acuerdo que en desacuerdo*)
- Disagree more than agree (*Más en desacuerdo que de acuerdo*)
- Strongly disagree (*Muy en desacuerdo*)

Recoded into two categories:

Reciprocal: Strongly agree + Agree more than disagree (1)

Nonreciprocal: Strongly disagree + disagree more than agree (0)

SURVEY EXPERIMENTS

Treatments in bold and underlined

Job Stability

[SHOW CARD]. On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means ‘Not at all likely,’ and 10 means ‘Very likely,’ how likely is it that you will continue working at the municipality next year, after the 2011/2015 mayoral elections **if the incumbent mayor is not reelected and the opposition wins?**

(JENTREGAR TARJETA) *En una escala de 0 a 10, donde 0 es NADA Probable, y 10 es MUY Probable, ¿Cuan probable es que Ud. siga trabajando en la municipalidad el año que viene, luego de las elecciones para intendente de 2011/2015 **si el actual intendente no fuese reelecto y ganara la oposición?***

Not at all likely (Nada Probable)				Likely (Probable)				Very likely (Muy Probable)			DK (NS)
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

Note: 2011 for Santa Fe and Tigre; 2015 for Salta

Job Stability bis (for Salta)

Now imagine that the next mayoral elections, instead of being in 2015, would be next year. In this same scale, how likely is it that you will continue working at the municipality next year, after these hypothetical elections **if the incumbent mayor is not reelected and the opposition wins?**

*(Ahora imagínes que las próximas elecciones para intendente, en lugar de ser en 2015, fueran EL AÑO QUE VIENE. En esta misma escala, ¿Cuan probable es que Ud. siga trabajando en la municipalidad el año que viene, luego de estas supuestas elecciones, **si el actual intendente no fuese reelecto y ganara la oposición?***

Not at all likely (Nada Probable)				Likely (Probable)				Very likely (Muy Probable)			DK (NS)
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

Note: For reasons beyond my control (explained in Appendix A), the survey in Salta had to be postponed. Consequently, the surveys in Santa Fe and Tigre were conducted around a year before the local elections, whereas the survey in Salta was conducted almost four years before the next elections. Thus, many non-tenured employees were expecting to get tenure in the near future, and this expectation would affect their responses about job stability. To get around this problem, a follow-up question (Job Stability bis) was included in Salta. Both questions are highly correlated (0.8 for tenured employees and 0.67 for non-tenured), and results are consistent across measures; so I use the question about the hypothetical election for consistency with the other municipalities.

Perception of Change

General satisfaction (framing question)

In general terms, how satisfied are you with your job? (*En términos generales, ¿Cuan conforme diría Ud. que está con su trabajo?*)

- Very satisfied (*Muy conforme*)
- Satisfied (*Conforme*)
- Not very satisfied (*Poco conforme*)
- Not at all satisfied (*Nada conforme*)

Perception of change

On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 'Not at all likely,' and 10 means 'Very likely,' how likely do you think it is that the level of satisfaction with your job will change next year, after the 2011 mayoral elections **if the incumbent mayor is not reelected and the opposition wins?**

(JENTREGAR TARJETA) *En una escala de 0 a 10, donde 0 es NADA Probable, y 10 es MUY Probable ¿Cuan probable cree Ud. que es que ese nivel de conformidad con su trabajo cambie el año que viene, luego de las elecciones para intendente de 2011 si el actual intendente no fuese reelecto y ganara la oposición?*

Not at all likely (<i>Nada Probable</i>)				Likely (<i>Probable</i>)			Very likely (<i>Muy Probable</i>)			DK (<i>NS</i>)	
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

Direction of change

Do you think that your situation will be better, the same, or worse? (*¿Ud. cree que su situación será mejor, igual o peor?*)

- Better (*Mejor*) (1)
- The same (*Igual*) (0)
- Worse (*Peor*) (-1)

Table B1: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Campaigns	1169	1.30	0.83	0	5
Rallies	1170	1.50	0.97	0	5
Monitoring	1172	0.99	0.74	0	4
Mayor Supporter	1184	0.33	0.47	0	1
Mayor Voter	1113	0.61	0.49	0	1
College	1181	0.23	0.42	0	1
Age	1184	3.20	1.21	1	5
Female	1184	0.45	0.50	0	1
Tenure	1183	0.50	0.50	0	1
Reciprocal	1176	0.86	0.34	0	1
Stability	1131	7.95	2.74	0	10
Change	1027	0.25	0.55	-1	1

Appendix C: Additional Tables and Robustness Checks

Table C1: How did you find out about this job?⁸

	N	%	
Through someone/an acquaintance that worked at the municipality	352	30%	
Through a friend/relative that worked at the municipality	328	28%	64%
“Through politics”	69	6%	
Submitted a resume to the municipality	156	13%	
Previous beneficiary of a welfare program	55	5%	
Through an employment agency/the media/ newspapers/ adds	40	3%	
Previous internship at the municipality	25	2%	
Entrance examinations	18	2%	
Some other way & missing	141	12%	
	1184	100%	

Note: Some examples of answers that specifically mentioned politics (“Through politics”) as the means of finding out about the job: “Through politics”; “Through a politician”; “Through a local broker”; “I used to work for a Peronist councilman”; “I used to work in politics with someone at the municipality”; “Because of political activism, social activism.” This, of course, does not mean that there were no political contacts on the other informal channels but it is interesting to note that some employees did not have any problems to openly admitting the political connection.

⁸ In Spanish: “¿Se acuerda cómo se enteró de este trabajo?”

Table C2: Relationship between current administration jobs and support for the mayor

	Mayor Voters	Mayor's Party Supporters
Current Administration	0.72 (0.02) N=492	0.39 (0.02) N=536
Previous Administrations	0.53 (0.02) N=619	0.27 (0.02) N=645
Difference	0.19** (0.03) N=1111	0.12** (0.03) N=1181

Note: Two-sample t-test with unequal variances and standard errors in parentheses

Table C3: Distribution of responses for the list experiment, across treatment and control

	Rallies				Electoral Campaign				Monitoring			
	Control		Treatment		Control		Treatment		Control		Treatment	
0	76	13%	61	10%	79	14%	79	13%	162	28%	130	22%
1	277	47%	259	44%	334	57%	271	46%	319	54%	319	55%
2	162	28%	158	27%	153	26%	175	30%	93	16%	112	19%
3	66	11%	70	12%	13	2%	47	8%	12	2%	24	4%
4	3	1%	36	6%	3	1%	12	2%	1	0%		0%
5			2	0%			3	1%				0%
Estimate	0.21***				0.22***				0.12***			
N	584		586		582		587		587		585	

Note: Assessing the magnitude of these estimates can be difficult without information about how many monitors, campaign workers, and rallies attendees are “needed” in an election. For the case of monitors, however, there is data that allows me to provide a precise estimate of the importance of public employees contribution. In Tigre, for example, 225,493 citizens were registered to vote in the 2009 election (the one held before the survey was conducted) and there were 652 voting booths or “*mesas*” (official data from the provincial electoral authorities, *Junta Electoral, provincia de Buenos Aires*). Political parties usually assigned one monitor by booth plus a head monitor —“*fiscal general*”— by school (where elections take place in Argentina), so 652 is a conservative estimate since it does not include the head monitor who is usually a relatively important broker. The total number of public employees in Tigre is 2406 (excluding elected officials and high rank position). Thus, provided that the sample was properly drawn, we can infer that 289 (12 percent of 2406) of those 2406 employees served as election monitors in the 2009 election. Therefore almost half (44 percent, 289 out of 652) of the people needed to monitor the 2009 election were local public sector employees, though only around 1 percent of Tigre’s voters are public employees. In the specific case of Tigre, the estimate for the proportion of employees that were election monitors in the previous election is actually 14% (not 12%), which means that 52 percent of all the monitors needed during the election were public employees. Similar data for the other two municipalities was not available.

Table C4: List Experiment estimates of political services by support for the mayor

		Electoral Campaign	Political Rallies	Election monitors
Mayor Party Supporter	Yes	0.34*** (0.08) N=379	0.28** (0.11) N=380	0.27*** (0.08) N=381
	No	0.16*** (0.06) N=790	0.20*** (0.06) N=790	0.06 (0.05) N=791
	Difference in means	0.18* (0.10) N=1169	0.08 (0.13) N=1170	0.21** (0.09) N=1172

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table C5a: Political Services. OLS Regressions. Coefficients for the Treatment Lists.

	Political Campaigns			Political Rallies			Election Monitors		
Treatment List									
Supporter (0-1)	0.194*	0.217**	0.177*	0.078	0.089	0.055	0.212**	0.236**	0.254**
	(0.102)	(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.129)	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.093)	(0.099)	(0.100)
Tenure (0-1)		0.076	0.081		-0.055	-0.044		-0.175	-0.167
		(0.120)	(0.121)		(0.139)	(0.138)		(0.109)	(0.109)
Reciprocal (0-1)			0.015			0.112			0.031
			(0.135)			(0.143)			(0.128)
Female (0-1)	-0.019	-0.043	-0.023	0.090	0.044	0.062	-0.021	-0.020	-0.025
	(0.102)	(0.098)	(0.097)	(0.116)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.091)	(0.090)	(0.090)
College (0-1)	-0.087	-0.033	-0.038	-0.084	-0.086	-0.076	0.011	0.005	0.009
	(0.110)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.130)	(0.128)	(0.129)	(0.108)	(0.112)	(0.113)
Age (1-5)	-0.024	-0.045	-0.047	0.041	0.060	0.052	-0.069*	-0.036	-0.040
	(0.042)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.042)
Salta		0.096	0.099		-0.003	0.004		0.005	-0.001
		(0.120)	(0.120)		(0.147)	(0.147)		(0.111)	(0.111)
Santa Fe		0.139	0.134		-0.006	-0.011		0.137	0.148
		(0.125)	(0.126)		(0.129)	(0.130)		(0.123)	(0.123)
Treatment constant	0.260	0.214	0.217	0.036	0.035	-0.048	0.288**	0.214	0.184
	(0.167)	(0.162)	(0.198)	(0.180)	(0.181)	(0.218)	(0.144)	(0.146)	(0.191)
Observations	1,166	1,165	1,157	1,167	1,166	1,159	1,169	1,168	1,160
R-squared	0.037	0.124	0.129	0.082	0.165	0.165	0.043	0.090	0.094

Note: OLS regressions with the list experiment counts as dependent variables (Figure 2 in the main document). All coefficients are interactions between each independent variable and the treatment (the list experiment condition including the sensitive activity). Table C5b below reports the coefficients for the non-interacted variables. The municipality of Tigre (the base category) was excluded. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table C5b: Political Services. OLS Regressions. Coefficients for the Control Lists.

	Political Campaigns			Political Rallies			Election Monitors		
Control List									
Mayor supporter	0.065	0.163***	0.170***	0.471***	0.532***	0.533***	-0.376***	-0.293***	-0.309***
(0-1)	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.080)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.062)	(0.066)	(0.067)
Tenure		-0.198***	-0.192***		-0.131	-0.126		-0.004	-0.002
(0-1)		(0.071)	(0.071)		(0.083)	(0.083)		(0.076)	(0.076)
Reciprocal			0.089			0.005			0.117
(0-1)			(0.094)			(0.103)			(0.075)
Female	-0.003	0.007	-0.002	0.023	0.049	0.042	0.038	0.037	0.044
(0-1)	(0.062)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.073)	(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.061)
College	-0.075	-0.010	0.000	-0.113	0.033	0.040	-0.017	0.004	0.012
(0-1)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.076)	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.076)	(0.076)
Age	0.038	0.055**	0.052*	-0.035	-0.046	-0.050	0.035	0.026	0.029
(1-5)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.028)
Salta		0.097	0.084		0.416***	0.406***		-0.106	-0.107
		(0.070)	(0.071)		(0.092)	(0.092)		(0.070)	(0.071)
Santa Fe		0.539***	0.544***		0.745***	0.748***		0.207**	0.198**
		(0.078)	(0.078)		(0.078)	(0.078)		(0.085)	(0.085)
Control constant	1.060***	0.837***	0.765***	1.359***	1.007***	1.018***	0.921***	0.886***	0.783***
	(0.108)	(0.100)	(0.135)	(0.122)	(0.112)	(0.144)	(0.092)	(0.094)	(0.111)
Observations	1,166	1,165	1,157	1,167	1,166	1,159	1,169	1,168	1,160
R-squared	0.037	0.124	0.129	0.082	0.165	0.165	0.043	0.090	0.094

Note: OLS regressions with the list experiment counts as dependent variables. Coefficients for the non-interacted variables from regression reported on Figure 2 on the main document. Interacted variables display on Table C5a. The municipality of Tigre (the base category) was excluded. Robust Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C6: Perception of Job Stability

... if the incumbent mayor is not be reelected and the opposition wins? (treatment)	7.75 (0.12) N=563
... ? (control)	8.15 (0.11) N=568
Treatment effect	-0.41** (0.16) N=1131

Note: Two-sample t-test with unequal variance. Standard errors in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table C7: OLS Regressions. Perception of Job Stability

	Likelihood of staying in the job after the next election		
New mayor treatment	-0.41** (0.16)	-0.43*** (0.15)	-0.33** (0.13)
Tenure			3.01*** (0.20)
College		-0.15 (0.20)	0.08 (0.18)
Female		-0.16 (0.17)	-0.06 (0.15)
Age		0.81*** (0.07)	0.20*** (0.08)
Salta		0.07 (0.17)	-0.86*** (0.18)
Santa Fe		-0.85*** (0.21)	-1.74*** (0.20)
Constant	8.15*** (0.11)	5.98*** (0.27)	6.87*** (0.26)
Observations	1,131	1,128	1,128
R-squared	0.01	0.15	0.33

Note: Since the outcome variable is measured on a 0 to 10 scale, an alternative specification would be an ordered probit. The results were substantively equivalent using either specification so OLS results are reported for simplicity. The tenure variable takes the value of 1 for tenure employees, and zero otherwise. The college variable takes the value of 1 for employees with a college degree, and zero otherwise. The female variable takes the value of 1 for women, and zero otherwise. The age variable takes on values from 1 to 5, corresponding to respondents who are 18-25, 26-35, 36-45, 46-55 and more than 55. The municipality of Tigre (the base category) was excluded. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C8: Perception of job stability, heterogeneous treatment effects

Characteristic	Whole Sample				Employees without Tenure			
	No	Yes	Difference in Effects		No	Yes	Difference in Effects	
Have Tenure	-0.62** (0.25) N=572	-0.03 (0.12) N=559	-0.60** (0.28) N=1131	-0.59** (0.27) N=1131				
Mayor Voter	0.34 (0.27) N=417	-0.96*** [0.21] N=647	1.30*** (0.35) N=1064	1.21*** (0.34) N=1064	0.65 (0.46) N=184	-1.41*** (0.31) N=348	2.06*** (0.55) N=532	1.79*** (0.48) N=532
Mayor Party	-0.18 (0.20) N=764	-0.89*** (0.28) N=367	0.71** (0.35) N=1131	0.71** (0.35) N=1131	-0.32 (0.30) N=378	-1.26*** (0.44) N=194	0.94* (0.53) N=572	0.99** (0.47) N=572
Municipal Dummies			NO	YES			NO	YES
					Employees with Tenure			
Mayor Voter					-0.16 (0.18) N=233	0.18 (0.17) N=299	0.34 (0.25) N=532	0.38 (0.25) N=532
Mayor Party					-0.07 (0.16) N=386	0.25 (0.18) N=173	0.32 (0.24) N=559	0.34 (0.24) N=559
Municipal Dummies							NO	YES

Note: In each panel, the first two columns show the average treatment effects calculated as the difference between the treatment and the control group (t-test with unequal variance). The last two columns show the difference in effects across respondents with and without each characteristic, and the last column includes controls for municipalities. Values in the left panel refer to the whole sample. Values in the right panels refer to employees with and without tenure. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table C9: Do you think that your situation would be better, the same or worse?

... if the incumbent mayor is not be reelected and the opposition wins? (treatment)	0.13 (0.03) N=499
...? (control)	0.36 (0.02) N=528
Treatment effect	-0.23*** (0.03) N=1027

Two-sample t-test with unequal variance. Standard errors in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Table C10: OLS Regressions. Likelihood of change

	Likelihood of changes in the job after the next election		
New mayor treatment	-0.23*** (0.03)	-0.23*** (0.03)	-0.23*** (0.03)
Tenure			-0.06 (0.04)
College		-0.10** (0.04)	-0.10** (0.04)
Female		0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)
Age		-0.03* (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)
Salta		0.16*** (0.04)	0.18*** (0.04)
Santa Fe		0.06 (0.04)	0.08* (0.04)
Constant	0.36*** (0.02)	0.39*** (0.06)	0.37*** (0.06)
Observations	1,027	1,024	1,023
R-squared	0.04	0.07	0.07

Note: The results were substantively equivalent when using ordered probit so OLS results are reported for simplicity. The tenure variable takes the value of 1 for tenure employees, and zero otherwise. The college variable takes the value of 1 for employees with a college degree, and zero otherwise. The female variable takes the value of 1 for women, and zero otherwise. The age variable takes on values from 1 to 5, corresponding to respondents who are 18-25, 26-35, 36-45, 46-55 and more than 55. The municipality of Tigre (the base category) was excluded. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C11: Likelihood of changes for better or worse, heterogeneous treatment effects

Characteristic	No	Yes	Difference in Effect	
Have Tenure	-0.29*** (0.05) N=521	-0.16*** (0.05) N=505	-0.13** (0.07) N=1026	-0.13* (0.07) N=1026
Mayor Voter	-0.10** (0.05) N=381	-0.31*** (0.05) N=590	0.21*** (0.07) N=971	0.21*** (0.07) N=971
Mayor Party	-0.15*** (0.04) N=701	-0.40*** (0.07) N=326	0.25*** (0.07) N=1027	0.25*** (0.07) N=1027
Municipal dummies			NO	YES

Note: First two columns show the average treatment effects calculated as the difference between the treatment and the control group (t-test with unequal variance). The last two columns show the difference in effects across respondents with and without each characteristic. The last column includes controls for municipalities. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

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